

FSMAO-1 CLARIFICATION NOTICE 16-98

OPNAVINST 5530.13B. Department of the Navy Physical Security Instruction for Sensitive

Explosives (AA&E): Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and

a. Master-Keying Versus Keyed-Alike: Although master-keying still remains prohibited, it has been determined that locks which are keyed-alike are authorized for AA&E use. The reason master-keying is prohibited is that the lock core is easier to pick open and becomes easier with each layer of master-keying that is permitted. Keyed-alike lock sets do not have the problem of defeating the lock core that master-keyed locks have.

Even though keying-alike is acceptable for all locks and highly recommended for secondary locks (i.e., weapons racks and cabinets), it is not the preferred method for "high security" locks. The requirement still exists for "high security" locks to be rotated at least annually; therefore, additional keyed-alike sets of high security locks would be needed to satisfy this requirement.

Reference: Head, Physical Security Unit, Security and Law Enforcement Branch, HQMC letter 5530/POS-16 of 9 September 1996.

b. Weapons in Level "A" Pack: Weapons placed in administrative storage, commonly referred to as Level "A" pack, do fall within the criteria established by paragraph 0401.d(1) of OPNAVINST 5530.13B. Therefore, for weapons' storage areas that are not continuously manned, weapons stored in level "A" pack will be chained or banded together in groups of 500 pounds.

Reference: Phoncon between Capt Davis (FSMAO-1) and SSgt Glass (Physical Security Chief, HQMC) of 5 September 1995.

c. Transporting Weapons and Ammunition in POVs: The commanding officer must authorize such transportation in writing. All ammunition will be secured in the front of the vehicle, and the weapon will be secured in the trunk. A question was asked if POV's could be used to transport armed guards escorting keys. The intent of the OPNAVINST is to allow personnel to transport weapons and ammunition in POV's for training purposes (i.e., to and from ranges), not for transporting armed guards escorting keys to AA&E spaces. Additionally, commanding officers may authorize transportation of weapons and ammunition across state lines to a designated military school, provided the school has identified those items as a requirement.

Reference: Phoncon between Capt Davis (FSMAO-1) and SSgt Glass (Physical Security Chief, HQMC) of 5 September 1995, and LAN message from SSgt Pierce (HQMC, POS-18) of 11 July 1997.

d. Continuously Manned, Constant Surveillance, and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS's): "Continuously manned," for OPNAV purposes, refers to personnel on the inside of an AA&E storage facility providing security, whereas "constant surveillance" refers to personnel on the outside of the facility or, in some cases, the use of closed-circuit TV (CCTV). "Intrusion detection systems (IDS's)" are electronic security systems designed to eliminate the need for "continuous manning" in some situations. "Continuously manned" satisfies the requirements for both "constant surveillance" and "IDS"; however, neither "constant surveillance" nor "IDS"

satisfy the situations that specifically require "continuous manning" (i.e., in facilities that are not continuously manned, rifle racks and containers weighing less than 500 pounds with weapons will be fastened to the structure or together in groups greater than 500 pounds with chains equipped with low security padlocks or with bolts).

Reference: LAN message from SSgt Glass (Physical Security Chief, HQMC) of 14 April 1995.

e. TOW Optic Sight Security: The specific type of sight is not addressed in Appendix A of OPNAVINST 5530.13B; however, the TOW launcher comprised of missile guidance set (AN/TSQ-136) and its optics (day sight, M-9155/TSQ and night sight, AN/TAS-4C) are all CATEGORY III and, therefore, require constant surveillance in accordance with Appendix F of OPNAVINST 5530.13B.

Reference: Phoncon between CWO4 Cote (FSMAO-1) and SSgt Pierce (HQMC, POS-18) of 9 September 1996.

f. Demil Certificate Authorization: The certifying person performing the demilitarization and inspection must have the next management level of maintenance countersign the document. DoD 4160.21-M-1, while it does not specify who that individual is, does specify in Appendix 6 methods used to demilitarize weapons.

Reference: LAN message from Maj Roland (HQMC, POS-16) of 21 October 1996.

g. Requirements to Conduct Key Inventories: A clarification was requested as a result of a conflict between OPNAVINST 5530.13B and OPNAVINST 5530.14B concerning when key inventories within the armory are required to take place. OPNAVINST 5530.13B states that key inventories will be accomplished semiannually, and the records of inventory will be maintained for one year. OPNAVINST 5530.14B states such inventories will be accomplished quarterly, and the records will be maintained for three years.

Response: HQMC (POS-18) states that the Marine Corps will comply with the requirements contained within OPNAVINST 5530.13B; that is, key inventories will take place within the armory semiannually and the records will be maintained for one year.

Reference: LAN message from SSgt Pierce (HQMC, POS-18) of September 30, 1997.

h. Requirement to Have an Armed Guard to Escort and/or Transport Ammunition: Paragraph 0714 of OPNAVINST 5530.13B states that an armed guard is not required for on-station (military installation) movement. A clarification was requested as to whether this requirement applies for movements off/outside a station (military installation).

Response: There will be an armed guard to escort and/or transport ammunition off/outside a military installation.

Reference: LAN message from Capt Jondema (HQMC, POS-43) of 14 July 1998.