

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
LOGISTICS OPERATIONS SCHOOL
MARINE CORPS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SCHOOLS
PCS BOX 20041
CAMP LEJEUNE, NORTH CAROLINA 28541-0041

MARINE CORPS STRATEGIC MOBILITY

STUDENT OUTLINE

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE: Given a participatory role in planning/supervising the strategic deployment of Marine forces, understand and adhere to the doctrinal principles and policies delineated in the references.

ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Given a multiple choice examination, without references, identify:

1. Applications of the three MAGTF deployment pillars.
2. Marine Corps basing options.
3. Marine Corps positions on power projection, to include: amphibious shipping, strategic sealift and airlift requirements.

STUDENT REFERENCES:

1. Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military Terms and Associated Terms.
2. Joint Pub 4-0, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint Operations.

REQUIRED RESOURCES:

1. Student Outline E867-1, Student Outline
2. Student Handout E867-2, MCP Volume I
3. Student Handout E867-3, "Forward From the Sea"
4. Student Handout E867-4, Marine Corps Concepts and Issues
5. Student Handout E867-5, "From-the-Sea" White Letter
6. Student Handout E867-6, MRS Volumes Executive Summaries
7. Student Handout E867-7, "Operational Maneuver From the Sea"

OUTLINE:

1. STRATEGIC MOBILITY. Strategic mobility is defined as,
"The
capability to deploy and sustain military forces worldwide in
support of national strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

2. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES PLAN (MCP). CMC provides the MCP to the unified combatant commander (CINC's) and joint staffs. The MCP is the principle document presented to the warfighting CINC's that provides the capabilities of the United States Marine Corps. The MCP has two volumes and classified supplement. We have provided you a copy of Volumes I and II. We recommend you read both volumes and refer to them often. The following is an extract from the 1992, Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volume I, Chapter 4, Marine Corps Deployment Concepts and Capabilities.

a. Deployment Options

(1) Amphibious/Strategic Sealift. Forces deployed in amphibious and strategic shipping can deploy rapidly to an area of interest and loiter until the need for employment arises. These forces provide a forcible entry capability and allow the greatest flexibility in time and method of employment.

(2) Airlift. Airlift has the advantage of speed, and need not sacrifice combat power or sustainability when deployed in conjunction with prepositioned equipment and supplies, such as that carried aboard the MPS Squadron. To exploit this deployment means, Air Contingency Forces (ACF's) are established in each MEF to provide a credible force which can deploy with minimal notice.

(3) Prepositioning. Significant MAGTF capabilities are found in the maritime and geographic prepositioning programs.

o Maritime Prepositioning Force. MPF gives the unified CINC's a new dimension in mobility, readiness, and global responsiveness. All three squadrons have been reconfigured to support Crisis Action Modules (CAM's) and allow the option of using less than an entire squadron and associated MEF Forward in response to a crisis.

o Norway Prepositioning Program/Norway Air-Landed MEB (NALMEB). This program provides prepositioned supplies and combat equipment in southern Norway for an airlifted MEB.

b. Basing Types. While not deployment options, the concepts of forward-basing and sea basing are important to understanding the deployment and sustainment of Marine forces in theater.

(1) Forward-Basing. Forward-basing provides a readily deployable force that will not require long range staging and avoids the problems of the initial extended lines of communications.

(2) Sea Basing. Reliance on sea basing minimizes U.S. presence in-country and enhances tactical flexibility, mobility, and supportability. This concept allows for provisioning of all combat service support from ships offshore.

c. Crisis Action Modules and Adaptive Planning. The Marine Corps has developed an array of improved deployment and force closure packages known as crisis action modules (CAM's). These modules are designed to support the requirements of adaptive planning. A simple example of CINC's adaptive planning is having plans to provide Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Mobile Training Team (MTT's), recommend political options (trade sanctions/embargoes), recommend forces for a show-of-force, recommend commencement of deployment of defensive forces and/or offensive forces.

(1) CAM's are a logical outgrowth of the Marine Corps MAGTF approach to crisis response and warfighting. The MAGTF, in and of itself, is a ground, aviation, and sustainment "module".

(2) CAM's do not replace MAGTF employment doctrine. They merely provide the joint force commander with a MAGTF at reduced force closure "cost" in time and strategic lift.

(3) Adaptive planning requires the CINC to have flexible

modules for various stages of crisis onset. The CAM's concept represents a philosophy much like the flexible options concept in adaptive planning.

(4) CAM's are preplanned packages of Marine Forces which match forces with available lift assets to give a required force capability - a MAGTF at the right time, at the right place.

(5) CAM's are also building blocks which provide options for the flow of Marine forces. Once a CAM has been developed it can be quickly adapted to fit the exact requirements of a particular crisis. It can either be modified or it can be combined with another CAM as the situation dictates.

(6) CAM's maximize the use of the joint pillars of strategic deployment (airlift, sealift and prepositioning). These pillars match the MAGTF deployment pillars:

- o Strategic Airlift
- o Amphibious/Strategic Sealift
- o Maritime Prepositioning Force Ships (with FIE)

(7) MAGTF's are capable of deployment by a variety and combination of means. Rather than deploying a single option, a MAGTF which deploys via this concept integrates the uses of all the assets available for both building and deploying forces.

(8) The following figure depicts the MAGTF deployment pillars and the Marine Corps forces associated with each pillar. Each deployment pillar is also made up of building blocks which allow a module to be organized for strategic movement and mission based upon the various lift assets available.

MAGTF DEPLOYMENT PILLARS
(Figure 4-1, Page 27, 1992 MCP)

(9) Traditionally these pillars have been used as vertical building blocks. That is, MAGTF's were built vertically, block by block, using only one of the deployment pillars.

(10) Instead, this concept uses not only the vertical blocks, it blends horizontally across these once discrete deployment options. Thus, MAGTF's can be: built by combining elements of the Air Contingency Forces, Amphibious Ready Forces, and Maritime Prepositioning Forces from all three MEF's and deployed by various combinations of the strategic deployment options (e.g., globally sourcing Marine forces).

(11) For example, in the following figure the majority of the troops, with limited equipment and sustainment are provided by the air contingency forces which deploys via the airlift pillar. The amphibious MEU, with troops and equipment but limited sustainment, is provided by a forward-deployed ARG/MEU (SOC) via the amphibious pillar. Finally, significant equipment and sustainment is provided by one of the reconfigured ships of the MPS squadron.

AN EXAMPLE OF MAGTF FORCE MODULE METHODOLOGY
(Figure 4-2, Page 28, 1992 MCP)

(12) As another example of the flexibility CAM's bring to adaptive planning, the MPS squadron and/or the ARG/MEU(SOC) could have moved early to the crisis area as part of a flexible deterrent option (FDO).

(13) MAGTF amphibious deployments will continue as the means for providing a landing force with forcible entry capability. This module concept is meant not to replace, but to supplement this capability.

(14) The Marine component commanders have each prepared several modules for a wide range of potential crisis and adaptive planning requirements. They continue to draft more. Unified commanders and Marine component commanders must coordinate to determine which modules are of potential use and to discuss the palpitation of additional modules which could fill in a planning void.

4. MARINE CORPS CONCEPTS AND ISSUES. The Marine Corps Concepts and Issues is a publication that CMC provides annually to the President, Congress, Department of Defense, Joint Staff,

unified commanders (CINC's), and other government agencies. We have provided you a copy of the Marine Corps Concepts and Issues, we recommend you read it cover-to-cover and refer to it often. It is an outstanding publication. We have also provided you a copy of the Secretary of the Navy, CNO, and CMC white letter "From the Sea". This letter provides the vision for the Navy Marine Corps team of the future [e.g., Naval Expeditionary Force (NEF)]. We recommend you read "From-the-Sea" and refer to it often. The following are extracts from the 1994 Marine Corps Concepts and Issues.

a. Amphibious Shipping

(1) Discussion

(a) Naval expeditionary forces, with embarked Marines, provide the Nation with a flexible Forward Presence and Crisis Response force as well as the most formidable forcible entry capability in the world. Arguably the most complex of military operations, the amphibious assault has been the forte of the Marine Corps since Guadalcanal. The mere threat of such an assault on the coast of Kuwait permitted the successful flanking attack to the west during the Gulf War.

(b) Joint Staff analysis of standing war plans identifies the amphibious lift required to support the National Strategy. Fiscal limitations have constrained our ability to meet the lift goal. Total lift capacity must also be tailored with the right numbers and the right types of ships to meet real world day-to-day commitments as well as combat surge capabilities.

(c) The current Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) requirement for a deployed Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) presence in three theaters identifies the need for a 12 ARG base force. The big deck amphibious ship (LHA/LHD/LPH) is the heart of every ARG. Current programming should maintain the number of

big decks at 12 for the near term, as new LHDs replace LPHs on a one-for-one basis.

(d) The Marine Corps is concerned with the shortfall in amphibious shipping to support the National Military Strategy. Early retirements and block obsolescence will sharply reduce the total number of amphibious ships. In FY97, 36 amphibious ships comprise the inventory. Current capitalization plans project a FY08 force level of 11 LHA/LHD, 12 LSD-41/49, and 12 LPD-17.

(e) The LPD-17 program is designed to replace four current ship classes (LPD, LSD, LKA, LST). The LPD-17 is an affordable, air-capable, LPD-like ship that is optimized to meet the required demands. Starting LPD-17 in FY99 and maintaining a 12 big deck ARG capability, are critical elements to meeting our Nation's future amphibious operational requirements.

(2) Marine Corps Position. The issue is more than quantifiable "lift" the issue is also adequate numbers of the right types of ships with the right capabilities for flexibility and utility. Intelligent investment in the amphibious ship building program is required. The Marine Corps needs a 12th big deck (LHD) to support world-wide forward presence, and a timely start of the LPD-17 program.

b. Power Projections Capabilities

(1) Discussion. For the Marine Corps to remain the premier amphibious assault force, we must revitalize the Nation's power projection capability. A robust ability to project decisive combat power from the sea adds significantly to our conventional deterrence and is in concert with our new National Military Strategy. Proliferation of sophisticated threat systems throughout the world has led to a series of concept-based modernization requirements. The Marine Corps has developed requirements consistent with our Operational Maneuver from the Sea concept which will provide for assaults to be

launched further offshore, with greater flexibility, speed, and combat power, all of which reduce the risk to our forces. Critical technological initiatives under way to maintain and enhance this concept include:

- o Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program will provide Marines with a credible, modern weapon system capable of fulfilling our mission needs, and will contribute to surviving and winning on the modern battlefield well into the 21st century. It will replace the AAV7A1 family of amphibious assault vehicles and is discussed in detail in the Concepts & Issues.
- o The MV-22 Osprey program is designed to replace the 40-year-old technology in our current medium-lift assault fleet comprised of venerable CH-46 Sea Knights and CH-53D Sea Stallions. Details regarding the program are discussed in detail in the Concepts & Issues.
- o The MCAC is one answer to the need for a Shallow Water Mine Countermeasures (SWMCM) program that is designed to develop mine countermeasure systems capable of detecting and clearing/neutralizing mines and obstacles in the landing area seaward to a depth of 200 feet and inland to the craft landing zone. Maturing technologies will dramatically improve our countermine capabilities.
- o Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) is a critical aspect of amphibious assault concepts. It serves as the primary means of close-in, indirect fire support until landing force artillery is established ashore. NSFS must provide allweather, around the clock, direct support to MAGTFs. With the retirement of the last remaining battleship in FY92, naval gunfire in support of landing operations currently rests solely on the limited range and lethality provided by 5-inch guns.
- o M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) is critical to direct fire support for power projection forces. Our concept requires two active and two reserve tank battalions, and MPF equipment to support three sets of 58 tanks each.

(2) Marine Corps Position. Operational Maneuver from the Sea provides an expanded dimension of combat power and

survivability to power projection forces. Reinvestment initiatives which emphasize surface and vertical assault tactical mobility, countermine, and fire support capabilities are essential to successful prosecution of these missions.

c. Sealift

(1) Discussion

(a) Employment of the three Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) squadrons during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm decisively demonstrated the utility of these expeditionary assets to the Nation. Coupled with fly-in Marines, MPF provided the first substantial ground defense capability in theater and the margin of deterrence that discouraged Iraqis from continuing into Saudi Arabia. Further, MPF squadrons provided sustainment for U.S. Army units in the first month of Operation Desert Shield.

(b) MPF assets were recently used in places like Somalia to support the humanitarian relief and security missions of Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope. Somalia's infrastructure proved extremely limited and required extensive engineering efforts to enable additional forces and equipment to arrive. During that initial 50-day build-up period, Marine MPF assets provided required logistics support for all United Nations forces ashore.

(c) Lessons learned during these operations revealed the need for a modest increase in MPF lift capacity. The three current MPF squadrons, composed of 13 ships, provide our Nation a unique geostrategically positioned capability. Our MPF upgrade concept would add an additional ship to each squadron (a total of three new ships) and significantly enhance Marine Corps expeditionary capabilities.

(d) These additional ships would be loaded with armor, naval support equipment (NSE), fleet hospitals, joint task force augmentation materiel, and expeditionary airfield (EAF) sets. The EAFs would dramatically increase our capability to project combined arms combat power without dependence on existing airfields or additional aircraft carriers.

(2) Marine Corps Position. This MPF upgrade concept is consistent with ... From the Sea, and would significantly increase responsiveness to developing contingencies, as well as improve operational flexibility for combat, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations.

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MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES PLAN (MCP)

VOLUME I

STUDENT HANDOUT

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"FORWARD FROM THE SEA"

CMC WHITE LETTER

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EXCERPTS FROM "MARINE CORPS CONCEPTS AND ISSUES"

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EMBARK E867-4 (1-98)

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"FROM THE SEA"

CMC WHITE LETTER

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MOBILITY REQUIREMENTS STUDY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES

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OPERATIONAL MANUEVER FROM THE SEA

STUDENT HANDOUT

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