

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
Logistics Operations School
Marine Corps Service Support Schools
Training Command
PSC Box 20041
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STUDENT OUTLINE

COURSE TITLE: Reserve Officer & SNCO Logistics Course

LESSON TOPIC NUMBER: D119

LESSON TOPIC: Coordinating Unit Security

INSTRUCTIONAL REFERENCES:

1. FMFM 2-6, MAGTF Rear Area Security
2. Joint Pub 3-10, Rear Area Security
3. FMFM 4- 1, Combat Service Support Operations
4. FMFM 6-1, Ground Combat Operations
5. FMFM 3-5, Employment of Military Police in Combat

OVERVIEW: The purpose of this class is to provide instruction in procedures for security support in a Combat Service Support Area.

a. Major Teaching Points:

- Identify security support requirements.
- Identify responsibilities in planning security training.
- Identify concerns when coordinating the use of Military Police.
- Procedures for managing the control of enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
- Understand techniques of employment of weapon systems.

·Types of security measures for an operation.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. Terminal Learning Objective: Given the applicable reference material, commander's guidance, situational threat, and OPLAN, identify security support requirements for the unit. (0402.07.01)

b. Enabling Learning Objectives: Without the aid of and per the references, state/identify:

1. Security support requirements based upon the threat.
2. Responsibilities in planning security training.
3. Concerns when coordinating the use of Military Police (MP).
4. Procedures for managing the control of enemy prisoners of war (EPW).
5. Techniques for the employment of weapons systems.
6. Types of security measures for an operation.

STUDENT MASTERY

a. **DATE MATERIAL WILL BE TESTED:** N/A

b. **MATERIAL WILL BE TESTED USING THE FOLLOWING METHOD:**
N/A

1. **REAR AREA SECURITY (RAS)**

a. Definitions

(1) Security. Security consists of the measures taken by a military unit, an activity, or installation to protect

itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. (JCS Pub 1)

(2) Rear Area. For any particular command, the rear area is that area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area of responsibility of the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of combat service support functions. (JCS Pub 1)

(3) MAGTF Rear Area. That area extending rearward from the rear boundary of the GCE to the MAGTF rear (FMFM) 2-6).

(4) Rear Area Security. Rear areas security consists of those measures taken before, during, or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof. (JCS Pub 1)

b. Objective of Rear Area Security. To allow for the defense of all forces operating within the MAGTF rear area so that those functions associated with rear area operations, such as aviation and logistics support, can continue uninterrupted with minimum degradation to combat operations. All units in the area must be prepared to defend themselves. Other objectives of RAS are as follows:

- (1) Secure the rear areas and facilities.
- (2) Prevent or minimize enemy interference with C4I.
- (3) Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and combat service support forward.
- (4) Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.
- (5) Find, fix, and if capable, destroy enemy incursions in the rear area.
- (6) Provide area damage control before, during, or after an incident or attack.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REAR AREA SECURITY

a. MAGTF responsibilities

(1) MAGTF Commander's Role. The MAGTF commander is responsible for the security of the MAGTF rear area. RAS for the MAGTF must be addressed by the MAGTF commander to ensure sustainability of combat forces. He then sets missions, tasks, and priorities for RAS as in any type of operation. He may delegate the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) commander or the Aviation Combat Element (ACE) commander the authority to coordinate the RAS mission. The MAGTF commander may also divide the rear area into smaller areas of responsibility, tasking each commander with their own area of responsibility. This commander is designated as the rear area security coordinator (RASC).

(2) Rear Area Security Coordinator (RASC). The rear area security coordinator is appointed by the MAGTF commander to coordinate rear area security. The RASC has the responsibility for coordinating the defensive effort in the rear area. The RASC is normally the CSSE commander because he is best located, organized, and equipped to accomplish the RAS mission. The RASC accomplishes this through the use of a Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC).

(3) Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC). The RAOC is task organized and collocated with the CSSE/MWSS combat service support operations center (CSSOC) to direct and control the RAS effort. The functions of the RAOC will be to:

- * Plan, coordinate, and control RAS.
- * Plan, coordinate and control fire/aviation support for RAS.
- * Effect coordination with other RAOCs.
- * Coordinate missions of the provisional security forces with the military police commander.
- * Effect coordination with the MAGTF command element and Ground Combat Element (GCE)/ACE operations section.
- * Monitor unit/facility positions and movement throughout the MAGTF rear area.
- * Make recommendations to the RASC for security force augmentation as the situation warrants.

- * Coordinate the area damage control effort.

The Tactical Security Officer (TSO) supervises the RAOC. He plans and coordinates the rear area security effort. The TSO must be aware of all support assets available for use in the rear area security plan. During the initial phases of amphibious assaults, the landing force support party (LFSP) commander will be the RASC. He will be responsible for the beach support area (BSA). Upon establishment of the rear area, the CSSE commander or a designated officer will act as the RASC.

b. Unit responsibilities

(1) Security Measures. Units are responsible for their own local security. Rear area units must establish and implement security, control procedures, and training that provide for in-depth security that will nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks. Security measures can be identified as either passive or active measures.

(a) Passive

- * Using camouflage, dispersion, and natural cover.
- * Hardening installations.
- * Establishing deception measures such as dummy installations and positions.
- * Positioning rear area units to be mutually supporting.
- * Establishing redundant facilities to preclude MAGTF support capabilities from being rendered ineffective should the primary facility be destroyed.

(b) Active

- * Train Marines in basic infantry skills to include anti-armor and air defense techniques.

- * Organizing units for defensive operations
- * Equipping support elements with weapons and munitions required for local defense.
- * Patrolling, establishing OP/LPs and using other local security techniques.
- * Providing security to convoys.
- * Positioning air defense in depth.
- * Establishing liasons with MAGTF fire support coordination agencies and training personnel to call for and adjust supporting arms fires.
- * Establishing and coordinating security and security reaction forces both within units and geographic areas.
- * Employing close air support and close-in fire support.
- * Establishing defensive plans and positions to include local barriers and obstacles.

(2) Training

(a) It is an absolute necessity to train combat service support Marines in the fundamentals of combat tactics and techniques particular to rear area operations. Of prime importance is training in:

- * Infantry weapons
- * Individual protection
- * Scouting and patrolling
- * Bayonet fighting
- * Hand-to-hand combat
- * Raids, riots, and guerilla-type operations
- * Camouflage and light discipline

(b) Personnel must be mentally conditioned to the fact that they will work normal hours at their primary duties plus extra hours as infantrymen protecting their installations.

(c) Training should also cover the various aspects of counterintelligence.

(d) Methods of identification and control of personnel and vehicles should be stressed. No one other than those cleared should be allowed in protected areas.

3. **FUNDAMENTALS OF RAS.** RAS is a MAGTF responsibility unless delegated to a subordinate unit commander. The RAS effort places minimum reliance on the GCE. The GCE should be tasked with security missions in emergencies only. The RAS effort must be proportionate to the threat and must not be so demanding on the rear area units that it renders their functioning ineffective.

4. **PLANNING**

a. The threat. The first step in developing an effective RAS plan is to determine what exactly the threat is to personnel located in the rear area. Using the acronyms SALUTE, DRAWD, and determining the enemy's most likely and most dangerous courses of action, our intelligence personnel are able to provide us with an accurate picture of the threat we will find ourselves facing. This will determine our defensive measures and alert levels. The threat levels are:

- * Level I---Those threats which can be defeated by local defense.
- * Level II--Threats which are beyond the capability of local defense, but which cannot be defeated by local defenses.
- * Level III-Those threats which require the MAGTF commander to employ the GCE to defeat them.

b. Planning considerations

(1) Coordination for fire support, air defense, close air support, close-in air support and use of intelligence assets must be established. Prior coordination with the ACE and GCE will facilitate implementation of air and fire support.

(2) The MAGTF commander must clearly define the role of the GCE, ACE and CSSE in the RAS effort to include who is the overall coordinator for RAS during an operation. The

MAGTF commander must also specify responsibility for completing the RAS tasks. They are as follows:

(a) Defense of CSS and ACE facilities. The local commander is responsible for the defense of the unit/facility. Depending on the threat level, the commander would have three options available:

* Level I - response is from the unit/facilities
Marines

* Level II - MP's and the Provisional Mobile
Security Platoon
(PMSP) would be called upon.

* Level III - The RAOC would request GCE
assistance.

(b) Security of the main supply routes (MSR) and lines of communication (LOC). This is the MP's primary mission in RAS. The MPs continuously move throughout the area to ensure safe passage of personnel. The PMSP can augment the MPs for this mission.

(c) Security of areas outside of CSSE and ACE facilities and areas away from MSRs and LOCs. The RASC may decide that security of areas outside of the facilities and away from the MSRs/LOCs, such as key terrain, avenues of approach, choke points, possible enemy assemble areas, are vital to the defense of the rear area. These may be covered by LPs/OPs or patrols.

(d) Airfield Defense. Should the ACE be geographically separated from the GCE and the CSSE, the ACE commander will establish a RAOC. The MWSS commander is normally appointed as the RASC and coordinates the rear area defense. When two or more airfields are established, the defense of each airfield will be coordinated by an airfield defense operations center (ADOC). The various ADOCs will come under control of the RAOC.

(e) Air Defense. Air defense sectors are designated by the ACE commander.

(3) Rear area units should anticipate enemy intentions based upon the threat assessment and plan accordingly.

(4) RAS planning should include the creation of redundant facilities, hardening of those facilities, and the protection of activities, to include convoys, so that no one capability, facility, or activity can be destroyed in one attack.

(5) RAS planning should also consider that RAS forces should be capable of finding, fixing and destroying an enemy unit. The size of the enemy unit that the RAS security forces should be capable of destroying will depend on the size and task organization of the MAGTF. A MEF RAS force should be able to destroy a company-sized unit (100-150) without GCE assistance, and be capable of finding and fixing an enemy battalion sized unit (500-600) while awaiting GCE assistance. Each MAGTF will have to evaluate these two requirements and determine their capability based on task organization.

(6) Damage control. Those measures taken before, during, and after a hostile action or natural disaster to reduce the probability of damage and to minimize its effects. The rear area units must be able to continue to provide the required support. There must be redundancy in support systems to provide for immediate restoration of CSS operations. It must be planned in two phases:

- (a) Before an attack or incident occurs.
- (b) During and after an incident occurs.

(7) Communications. Effective communications are essential for rear area units not only to aid in providing effective CSS, but also to effectively coordinate the rear area security effort. In order to establish effective communications, each of the following must be examined:

- * Terrain features that affect communications.
- * CSS site selection.
- * EW threat to communications.
- * Assets available.
- * Ability to lay wire.

The communications officer/chief should be involved in the planning process and provide input during the CSS site selection process. This includes the assignment of tactical nets and fire support nets.

5. ASSETS AVAILABLE FOR RAS

a. Supporting arms/Forces.

(1) Supporting arms are crucial for the effective defense of rear areas. Assets available will vary with the MAGTF configuration and the tempo of operations. It is imperative that Marines are able to communicate with and control supporting arms. Assets available may include:

- * Attack Helicopters
- * Mortars
- * Artillery
- * Naval Gunfire
- * Fixed-Wing attack aircraft

(2) GCE Elements. Rear area units may have ground combat elements available to augment security forces. These might include units held in reserve and reaction forces.

(3) Naval Construction Forces (Sea-Bees). Along with its construction equipment, the NCF has a variety of weapons to include light infantry weapons, heavy machine guns, and mortars.

(4) Host Nation. If operating in a friendly country, that country's own military and police forces may provide assistance.

b. Military Police

(1) Security support is provided primarily by the Military Police company, Headquarters and Service Battalion, FSSG. This unit cannot provide all security support functions simultaneously. MPs are an economy of force unit that must be used wisely. In support of the MAGTF, the MPs have a fourfold mission:

- * Battlefield circulation control.

- * Area security.
- * Enemy prisoner of war management.
- * Law and order.

(2) The main combat mission of the MPs is battlefield circulation control. Battlefield circulation control ensures combat personnel, equipment, and supplies move smoothly, quickly, and with little interference on main supply routes (MSRs). MPs control circulation to meet changes in tactical situations and route conditions. Enemy forces interdicting the MSRs disrupt movement and create the need for extensive rerouting. Shocked and disoriented Marines must be controlled and directed to their units. Refugees and abandoned civilian vehicles may clog main roads, slowing movement of combat forces. MPs reconnoiter primary and alternate routes, enforce MSR regulations, control refugees and stragglers, disseminate information, and support river crossing operations.

(3) The MPs area security mission is often performed simultaneously with the battlefield circulation control mission. This mission tasks the MPs to help protect rear area units against spies, saboteurs, and enemy forces. MPs identify and patrol potential landing zones, drop zones, and high speed avenues of approach to detect enemy activities early. MPs act as an early warning system, they destroy small enemy forces before they can close on their objectives. Enemy forces too large to be defeated by MPs are quickly identified, reported, and delayed and disrupted until rear area forces arrive or until the MAGTF commander can redeploy his forces. In critical situations, MPs may provide limited convoy escort.

(4) MPs control the flow of EPWs from their capture to their internment in EPW camps. They operate collection points and evacuate captured EPWs to collection points or temporary holding compounds. MPs, when augmented by other units, operate the MAGTF's EPW holding facility.

(5) The MPs' law and order mission extends the CSSE commander's ability to suppress the chance for criminal behavior and to provide police services. These include criminal and traffic investigations and the preservation of good order and discipline. This mission is limited in a combat environment and is performed only when the commander requires it and the battle intensity permits.

c. Provisional security forces. The RASC can organize two types of provisional security forces, the provisional mobile security platoons and the provisional helicopter borne security company. These units are made up of organic T/O personnel.

Based on the mission and threat assessment, these units can be used to supplement local defense efforts and to give assistance to the military police. The TSO should attach the PMSPs to the military police (MP) for normal operations.

6. **EMPLOYMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS.** The rear area defense is organized in depth with mutually supporting positions. Units occupying large bases or areas usually lack the manpower to adequately defend extensive perimeters. The commander should concentrate his forces along likely avenues of approach, on key terrain, and around critical positions. Unoccupied portions of the perimeter can be effectively covered by a combination of direct/indirect fire, obstacles, or active patrolling. The types of weapons available can be as unique as each task organized CSSE. These weapons can include light infantry weapons (M2, MK19, SAW, SMAW, AT4 etc, etc).

a. The machine gun is the anchor of the defense. The positioning of crew-served weapons should form mutual, overlapping zones of fire where possible. Machine guns are emplaced where they can have interlocking fires. Interlocking fires are fires that join two or more systems to form an intersecting line of fire. Interlocking fires reduce the number of gaps in the Final Protective Line (FPL) and provides mutual support between adjacent units. Weapons such as the M2 50 cal, and the M240G are positioned to cover likely avenues of approach. The weapons should be employed close to their maximum effective range. Ie. an M2 covering an avenue of approach only 150 meters long may be ineffective. Each of these weapons should have a Principle Direction of Fire (PDF). These PDFs will be depicted on a fire plan sketch.

b. Ideally machine guns are used to provide grazing fire. Machine guns are also used to cover obstacles. Tactical and supplementary wire are two very popular obstacles that are usually covered by machine gun fire. The MK19 is a direct fire weapon that can also be employed in the indirect fire mode. The M2 can also be employed as an indirect fire

weapon when necessary. More details about employment of weapon systems can be found in the references and during your Marines' annual Battle Skills Training.

7. **CONTROLLING ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW).** The Geneva Convention states that capturing powers are responsible for the proper and humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilian internees. When operating jointly, the U. S. Army receives all detainees captured by the U. S. Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force. The U. S. Army receives prisoners as soon as possible after completing initial classification and administrative processing.

a. Collection points are areas where EPWs are collected and held temporarily while awaiting further transportation to the rear. They should be close enough to the MSR and command post to facilitate EPW movement to the rear. Upon capture, combat units are responsible for getting the EPWs to the battalion collection point. Battalion collection points are operated by the capturing unit, NOT by MPs. When possible, the unit operating the battalion collection point should then transport the EPWs to the GCE collection point. Once EPWs are at the GCE collection point, MPs hold them until transportation is available to take them to the holding facility in the MAGTF rear area. All EPWs will of course be tagged. Tags are locally produced, they are not a supply system item.

b. Security of the EPWs is provided through these very basic steps:

(1) Search - Search for weapons and any documents, they may keep personal effects.

(2) Segregate - Segregate EPWs into specific categories. Officer, Enlisted and sex categories, possibly noncommissioned officer, deserters, and civilians.

(3) Silence - All personnel will prohibit talking among the EPWs during movements.

(4) Speed - EPWs are moved from the point of capture as soon as possible. Make maximum use of transportation returning to the rear. EPWs usually attempt escape as soon as possible after capture. Speedy removal from familiar

surroundings and their own units will lesson the likelihood of an attempted escape.

(5) Safeguard - Commanders at all levels are responsible for the proper treatment and safeguarding of detainees in their custody. All personnel must always be alert to protect prisoners from harm, as well as preventing their escape.

c. The Geneva convention supports the requirement that prisoners receive medical care from their own medical personnel who have been detained by the capturing power. Health care should be rendered using their own medical materials but, if not available, material will be provided by U. S. Forces.

d. Holding facilities in the MAGTF rear area accept EPWs 24 hours a day. EPWs are held until they are transferred to U. S. Army custody, if appropriate, or in some cases the civilian or military authorities of the host nation. At a minimum these facilities will provide:

- emergency medical care, as needed
- food, water, and shelter
- maintain proper segregation

When applicable, early coordination with the closest U. S. Army unit on EPW transfers is essential. In a combined or joint operation, coordination should include procedures for turning over prisoners to the appropriate authorities regardless of level of capture. As mentioned earlier, EPWs must be moved to the rear as quickly as possible. Early transfer allows MPs to concentrate on other support roles and reduces the logistical requirements of holding prisoners for an extended time.

UNDER NO CONDITION ARE EPWs USED TO MAKE AN AREA IMMUNE FROM ENEMY ATTACK OR FIRE.

e. Handoff Procedures: Forward MPs are responsible for the security of prisoners until they are released to the next rearward MP unit. MP units must coordinate with one another and establish several locations to use when transferring EPWs from one MP unit to the next. When transporting EPWs, MPs should take full advantage of all available space on vehicles

returning to the rear. The receiving MP unit assumes the security responsibility at the transfer point. Whenever possible, the transportation already in use should continue to the holding facility to avoid all potential security problems by transferring EPWs to other vehicles.

f. Manpower requirements: It would be difficult to set a required number of guards for the movement of EPWs. Commanders must use the factors of METT-TSL to make a determination. There are several factors that must be examined to help estimate the manpower requirements to include:

- Number of EPWs
- Construction of a holding facility
- Morale and physical condition of EPWs

g. Logistical requirements: MPs and engineers identify construction materials and equipment for EPW facilities in the operational planning stage. Engineers can also provide the heavy machinery and labor for constructing EPW facilities. Medical personnel must be involved in establishing sanitation requirements. The GCE collection points usually hold detainees for a short time, depending on the mobility of the unit. In the MAGTF rear area, holding facilities detainment is limited to the time necessary to coordinate the release of EPWs to the U. S. Army or host nation authorities. Detailed layouts for collection points and holding areas are in FMFM 3-5.

h. Interrogator-Translation: The interrogator-translation unit of the Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group (SRIG) conducts interrogations and translates for EPWs. As soon as possible, at the most forward level, EPWs are made available to this unit. This facilitates front units receiving the most recent and timely information. MPs must avoid getting involved in interrogations and translating. MPs should only communicate with EPWs to accomplish a task.